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ABSTRACT 
 
This document is the paper-format version of the keynote address delivered by its 
author on August 2, 2009, to the opening session of the Latin American section 
(AMILAT) of the 15
th World Congress of Jewish Studies, at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem. It attempts to understand the long-term shift towards the worse of Israeli-
Latin American relations, which started with an almost unqualified support for the 
establishment of the State of Israel on the side of both Latin American right-wing 
governments and left-wing parties and popular organizations, but have been 
deteriorating ever since. It suggests that this involution can be largely explained in 
terms of at least four intervening variables: Israel’s vulnerability, its special relationship 
with the United States after 1967, Latin American social structure, and the class 
identity of the leadership of the Latin American Jewry. It argues that overlooking the 
peripheral character of Israel in the interstate system has led to distortions in the 




Este documento es la versión académica de la conferencia magistral impartida por su 
autor el 2 de agosto de 2009, en ocasión de la inauguración de las sesiones de la 
sección latinoamericana (AMILAT) del 15º Congreso Mundial de Estudios Judíos, 
llevado a cabo en la Universidad Hebrea de Jerusalén. Intenta descifrar el giro negativo 
de las relaciones israelí-latinoamericanas, que se iniciaron con un casi pleno apoyo 
latinoamericano al establecimiento del Estado de Israel (por parte tanto de gobiernos 
frecuentemente de derecha, como de partidos y organizaciones populares de 
izquierda) y ha sufrido un continuo deterioro desde entonces. Sugiere que este 
deterioro se explica principalmente en términos de cuatro variables: la vulnerabilidad 
de Israel, su relación especial con los Estados Unidos a partir de 1967, la estructura 
social latinoamericana y la identidad de clase de la dirigencia de las comunidades 
judías de la región. Sostiene que el olvido del status periférico de Israel en el sistema 
interestatal ha conducido a distorsiones en la conceptualización de las relaciones 
israelíes-latinoamericanas.    2 









This paper applies peripheral realist theory to the case of the long-term interstate 
relations between Israel and the Latin American countries.
* It attempts to understand 
the shift towards the worse in these relations, which started with the full-fledged Latin 
American support for the establishment of the State of Israel and have been 
deteriorating ever since. It suggests that this involution can largely be explained in 
terms of at least four intervening variables: Israel’s vulnerability, its special relationship 
with the United States after 1967, Latin American social structure, and the class 
identity of the leadership of the Latin American Jewry.  
 
The theoretical framework 
 
Peripheral realism argues that the so-called structure of the international system is not 
what Stephen Waltz and other neorealists call ‘anarchy’, which is to say an order in 
which the states are ‘like units’ all of which have the same functions. It is rather an 
‘incipient hierarchy’ with three different types of states with different functions: rule-
makers, rule-takers and rogue states (the latter being countries that lack the power 
needed for rule-making yet refuse to accept the formal and informal rules established 
by the great powers).    
 
From the point of view of this conception, both the Latin American states and Israel 
are peripheral states. They are all rule-takers. The fact that Israel has atomic weaponry 
does not contradict this diagnosis, because it acquired it before the hierarchical non-
proliferation regime was born. Dimona was uncovered in 1960 and the NPT was only 
open for signature in 1968. The United States did not approve of Israel’s acquisition of 
atomic weapons, but their opposition was not the equivalent of a forceful veto.  
 
It must be understood that the issue is not that peripheral states lack the possibility of 
challenging the rules set by the central states, but rather that such challenges usually 
entail ruinous consequences for these countries and their citizens. The cost of the 
                                                 
* A previous version of this paper was delivered as keynote address to the opening session of the Latin 
American section (AMILAT) of the 15
th World Congress of Jewish Studies, at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem on 2 August 2009. 
** Senior tenured researcher (Investigador Principal), CONICET (Argentine Council of Scientific 
Research), Professor of Political Science and International Relations, UCEMA, and director of 
CEIEG/UCEMA. The author’s points of view do not necessarily represent the views of 
Universidad del CEMA. 
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challenge is too high for most societal structures-of-preferences, and this is what 
generates an incipiently hierarchical world order.  
 
That said, it must also be noted that dependence and peripherality work in very 
different ways for Latin America and Israel. On the one hand, until the 1980s Latin 
American societies had been hostage to a de facto veto power of their military elites 
vis-à-vis civilian governments. This led to cycles in which the military and the 
professional politicians alternated ruling these countries. This peculiar political system 
in turn conditioned the relations between the Latin American states and hegemonic 
powers in a way totally unknown to Israeli political life. 
 
But on the other hand, in some ways Israel was and continues to be more bound than 
Latin America to limits to its sovereignty set by the United States. Under the Obama 
administration this has become patently clear. Simply because of its size, Israel will not 
be able to survive nuclear proliferation in the Middle East without the protection of a 
great power. It is surrounded by mortal enemies and lacks strategic depth. It depends 
existentially on its alliance with the United States as no Latin American country does. 
Yet curiously, Israel’s status as a peripheral country tends to be understated by studies 
on Israeli-Latin American relations.
†  
 
This is not the only characteristic frequently overlooked by studies of Israeli-Latin 
American relations. The same occurs with a related issue: Israel has not always had a 
security alliance with the United States. This is well-known to the informed public but 
is at times understated by classics of the field. Indeed, for a long time after Israel’s 
independence, US policy was equidistant between Israel and the Arab states. In the 
mid-fifties, Israel’s requests for US arms were rebuffed.
‡ The first major sale of US 
weapons, which consisted of Hawk antiaircraft missiles, took place as late as 1963.
§ But 
the real strategic alliance was forged only after the Six-Day War, when Israel’s unlikely 
success convinced Washington that it could help them win the Cold War in the Middle 
East. 
 
Notwithstanding, most studies of Israeli-Latin American relations seem to take the US-
Israeli alliance for granted, as if it were analogous to the US-UK alliance. There seems 
to be a reluctance to acknowledge that the forging of this alliance was one of the 
greatest strategic successes in the history of Israel, one without which it probably 
would not be able to survive. Indeed, in the bibliography on Israeli-Latin American 
relations it is hard to find recognition of Israel’s dependent and peripheral status. 
There is an unconscious tendency to think of Israel as an advanced, “First World” 
power dealing with needy developing countries. This not only undermines explicatory 
analysis but also ethical evaluations of Israeli foreign policies. Albeit in a different way, 
Israel is much needier and more dependent than most Latin American countries.  
 
In this paper it is argued that as a consequence of the peripheral character of two of 
the three parties involved, the US-Israeli-Latin American triangle has functioned in 
such a way as to put Israel on the wrong side of history vis-à-vis Latin America. This 
happened as a paradoxical consequence of Israel’s success in securing its alliance with 
the United States. Thus, in making my case I will explain the present-day unpopularity   4 
of Israel in Latin America without recourse to variables such as anti-Semitism or 
Judeophobia. This is not because such variables do not intervene, but rather because it 
seems sociologically plausible to assume that even if they did not intervene, Israel 
would now be unpopular there. Needless to say, the fact that anti-Semitic feelings 
linger on makes the problem more acute. Last but not least, it must be emphasized 
that this paper’s orientation is not normative. It does not pretend to lay blames or to 
provide normative advice for foreign policy. Rather, it seeks to explain. 
 
The Latin American state/society complexes 
 
As stated before, the good start that characterized the first decades of Israel’s relations 
with Latin America slowly turned for the worse some twenty-five years ago. In order to 
understand why things worked out this way we must delve into a couple of crucial 
political and structural characteristics of Latin American states.  
 
This is a necessary step because, from the perspective of the long-term, states are not 
the real protagonists of the interstate system, as the rational actor model of 
international relations theory would have us suppose. Rather, putting it in the 
Gramscian terms of theoretician Robert Cox, the real long-term actors of international 
relations are state/society complexes.
**  
 
Indeed, a state’s foreign policy decisions not only affect other states but their own 
society as well, as do the reactions to the said decisions stemming from other states. A 
sequence of actions and reactions transforms society, and by so doing, conditions and 
sometimes modifies the state itself. For this reason, relations between states cannot 
be fully understood without studying the domestic orders of their societies. 
 
Two societal factors of a very different nature that must be taken into account when 
we attempt to explain why Israeli-Latin American relations worsened are:  
   
1.  The post-1983 establishment of full electoral democracies in the region, which 
put an end to the military’s former de facto veto power, and 
2.  Latin America’s extreme concentration of income. 
 
The first of these factors is directly related to the souring of Israeli-Latin American 
relations, while the second is indirectly related to the reasons why it is unlikely that 
these relations will return to their former harmony within the foreseeable future. I will 
begin with the consequences of the shift from the military-veto system to full electoral 
democracy. 
 
Proxy paradise: Latin America before democratization 
 
A naïve reading of Israeli-Latin American relations after the consolidation of the Israeli 
alliance with the United States would have run something like:  
 
a)  Israel now has an asymmetric strategic alliance with the United States.  
b)  Since its founding, Israel has had excellent relations with most of Latin America.    5 
c)  The United States is hegemonic in Latin America, and most of its countries are 
subject to Department of State policy guidelines. 
d)  When they are not, their governments are usually overthrown and a regime is 
established that normally returns to the fold. 
e)  Hence, when opportunity affords, it is in Israel’s interest to cooperate with the 
United States in Latin America. 
 
This reading appears to have guided Israeli policy towards Latin America for a lengthy 
period. One does not need to study Israeli archives to posit this idea. Suffice it to make 
a careful reading of the classic Kaufman et al volume on Israeli-Latin American 
relations. Indeed, that book is not only a useful scholarly work but also an invaluable 
period piece that unwittingly documents some perceptions that guided policy at the 
time of its publication (1979). Its authors state:  
 
The Latin American military are a governing elite. Often characterized by 
anticommunist fervor, the military –either in government or ‘close’ to it—have 
seen Israel as a Western outpost standing in the way of the Soviet Union and 
revolutionary leftist governments. (…) Thus, Israel’s triumph in the Six-Day war 
was seen by the more conservative and pro-Western establishments as a 
victory over a common enemy. (…) On the whole, the ‘military factor’ as an 
‘independent variable’ seems to have worked toward intensification of 
relations between Israel and several Latin American nations.
†† 
 
In other words, the bilateral relations between Israel and the Latin American states 
were good because there was a strong rapport between Israel and the Latin American 
military. To this, Kaufman, Shapira and Barromi add unambiguously: ‘In addition to 




In other words, in doing business with the Latin American military, Israel not only 
promoted its self-interest but also that of Latin American societies that supposedly 
benefited from their ‘modernizing elites’. The authors not only understood the reasons 
why relations were good; they also suggested that engaging in these lucrative relations 
was the right thing to do. 
 
The state-of-affairs praised by Kaufman et al continued while the United States and the 
Latin American military cooperated in what was usually their common interest: the 
vetoing of leftist and nationalist civilian governments in the region. While this order 
lasted, the relations between Israel and most governments improved constantly, at 
least if we measure them in terms of the proceeds of Israel’s arms exports.  
 
From an Israeli standpoint this outcome was heaven sent, inasmuch as the young 
nation state, surrounded by mortal enemies, had developed an extraordinary military 
expertise, a modern arms industry, and with it a dependence on the exportation of 
arms. An asymmetrical strategic alliance with the United States and a massive sale of 
arms to governments in the latter’s back yard were parts of what, in those days, was   6 
perhaps one of the few available survival paths open to this beleaguered peripheral 
state.  
 
The alliance became even more advantageous when President Jimmy Carter chastised 
the Argentine and Chilean military regimes due to violations of human rights. This US 
policy was always extremely contradictory. While the State Department imposed 
apparently severe limits to cooperation, the US Treasury trusted the neoliberal 
economic administrations of both dictatorships and discretely gave them financial 
support.  
 
For example, visible aid in the form of credits was replaced by less visible aid through 
guarantee programs. US missions to multilateral credit institutions voted against 
Argentina, but did not lobby among allies to block the credits, which were awarded in 
record amounts.
§§ Concomitantly, in the sensitive field of military cooperation, the 
place of the United States was partly occupied by its surrogate, Israel.  
 
Indeed, towards 1981 arms exports helped to control Israeli balance of payments 
problems.
*** By the middle ‘80s, Israel had become the world’s largest per capita arms 
exporter. Its arms trade approximated 16% of its total exports and close to one-third of 
its total industrial exports. Sales to Latin America amounted to one-third of its total 
arms exports, making the region Israel’s most important arms market.
††† Moreover, 
Latin America differed qualitatively from other markets because its purchases included 
jet aircraft, large armaments, missile systems, and communications and electronic 
equipment.
‡‡‡ And during the crucial 1972-1984 period, arms sales were by far the 
most important component of Israeli-Latin American trade. On a yearly basis, the 




In the especially significant case of Argentina, from 1978 to 1983 Israel exported more 
than one billion dollars worth in military equipment, including US made A-4 
Skyhawks.
**** Given the fact that Israel was the most important recipient of US military 
aid, this would have been impossible without at least Washington’s silent 
acquiescence. Indeed, the latter applied sanctions against the Argentine government 
due mainly to a public relations rationale, leaving to Israel and others the dirty work of 
supplying arms to an allied anti-Communist dictatorship. 
 
There is considerable evidence pointing in the same direction. According to Armony as 
well as to apparently reliable court testimonies,
†††† Mossad shared intelligence with 
the Argentine army on Montonero combatants training at PLO camps in Lebanon, as 
well as with the infamous Batallion 601 of the Argentine army, active in Operation 
Cóndor. Armony also reports that: 
 
the Argentine regime played a role in the US program for the covert sale of 
arms to Iran with the help of Israel. (…) In 1981, Israel and Argentina took part 
in a secret deal between the Israelis and the Khomeini regime involving the 
provision of 360 tons of US-made spare parts for tanks and ammunition for the   7 




Thus, the United States sacrificed some income for the sake of prestige, but without a 
strategic loss, insofar as Israel’s balance of payments situation made it necessary to 
sacrifice principle, narrowly understood, for an income that was quite substantial in 
terms of its limited resources. For different reasons, it was a good deal for both, as well 
as for the tyrants of Argentina.  
 
For Israel, the political costs would become visible only in the long term. The case 
illustrates the characteristics of asymmetrical alliances and the relevance of peripheral 
realism as a tool for their analysis, inasmuch as the US-Israeli-Latin American triangle 
was (and is) a non-Waltzian hierarchical interstate structure. 
 
The use of the term “proxy” to characterize the Israeli role in Latin America during the 
‘70s and ‘80s seems entirely fair. This role was part of a survival strategy that helps to 
understand the causes for the decline of Israel’s prestige in Latin America when the 
United States eventually reviewed its policy for the region, practically outlawing 
military regimes. This shift generated political benefits for the superpower and 
considerable political costs to its proxy, exposing one of several mechanisms through 




As stated, for a decade and a half the sacrifice of principle to survival goals did not 
generate visible political costs for Israel in Latin America.
§§§§ But everything changed 
with the 180º shift in US policy. This was mainly the result of Argentina’s invasion of 
the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in 1982. The event generated a dramatic change even in 
the most conservative US perceptions regarding Latin American affairs. Military 
governments came to be considered more a liability than an asset for the United 
States. It was reasoned that in the Latin American region, which was and remains far 
away from the main axes of competition for world power, a rogue military regime 
could potentially produce more damage to US interests than the most anti-US of 
democratically-elected populist governments, which would always be subject to a 
greater measure of citizen control.  
 
From then on, an implicit but powerful alliance was established between the State 
Department and the professional political classes of Latin America. This made military 
coups a very risky enterprise for would-be perpetrators, as the case of Honduras vividly 
demonstrated in 2009. It crowned the mostly populist professional politicians as 
masters of the local power games. The local bourgeoisies, which had traditionally 
pushed for coups, were forced to look elsewhere than the military for the pursuit of 
their class interests. 
 
A dramatic democratisation of Latin American politics followed. Professional politicians 
ascribed to the populist parties that were fated to dominate politics took charge, and 
the image of Israel became tainted, apparently beyond repair.   8 
 
The structural constraints of Latin American foreign policies under full electoral 
democracy 
 
This is where our structural variable comes in. Latin America enjoys the dubious honor 
of having the greatest concentration of income worldwide. Although there are poorer 
regions, poverty is very substantial. According to the Andean Development 
Corporation, in 2005 the proportion of the population living on less than two dollars a 
day amounted to 37 percent in Brazil, 39 percent in Mexico, 45 percent in Argentina, 
48 percent in Venezuela, 50 percent in Colombia, 54 percent in Peru and 62 percent in 
Bolivia. These levels of poverty come together with very deficient educational systems.  
 
Military governments usually represented elites that benefitted from the 
concentration of income. And due partially to the socially-polarizing consequences of 
those policies of the past, Latin American societies were caught in a populist trap. As 
was to be expected, once full electoral democracy was in place, power drifted away 
from the previously dominant elites. Societies where the vast majority of the 
population is poor seldom elect right-of-center governments. If, in addition, education 
is deficient, electoral democracy under conditions of massive poverty often leads to 
populist governments. Normally, these regimes will not be inclined to adopt a foreign 
policy that runs counter to popular clichés.  
 
In such circumstances both the hegemonic power and its proxy will tend to be 
unpopular with the new democratic regimes. But there is a huge difference between 
the two, because Latin American dependence on the hegemonic power will remain 
strong, but such will not be the case vis-à-vis the proxy. The superpower’s support is 
often needed, and it is preferable to avoid its ill-will. Moreover, some local political 
sectors will recognize that despite its past complicity with the region’s bad guys, the 
superpower has now become an active agent of democratisation, restoring its soft 
power. But such will not be the case for the proxy, whose stigma will not be easily 
removed. 
 
The Arabs vis-à-vis Israel in the Latin American context today 
 
In principle, the case made above is valid for any proxy. But Israel is not any proxy, 
because it has more enemies than most. Indeed, while Israel’s fate in Latin America 
was jeopardized by its alliance with the United States (paradoxically its most important 
asset), its enemies in the Middle East sought the favor of popular organizations in the 
region. This would eventually put them in a more favorable position vis-à-vis the 
populist governments that were to emerge after democratisation. This is what makes 
Israel different from other Western countries that also supplied arms and security 
services to Latin American tyrants.
*****  
 
Indeed, as early as 1952 the Arab League established itself in Latin America. It is no 
coincidence that its activity was intensified after the Six-Day War, insofar as the 
establishment of an US-Israeli alliance provided a great opportunity to erode the image 
of Israel among the working classes and leftist political groups. Despite tactical Arab   9 
mistakes such as siding with pro-Nazi circles in Argentina, this was a significant 
development that unfolded incessantly through diverse protagonists and means.
††††† 
Indeed, in the early 1970s the PLO was already establishing strong links with various 
guerrilla groups in Latin America, such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
‡‡‡‡‡ 
 
However, in those days it did not yet seem that this trend would represent a serious 
challenge, because most progressive social and political forces in Latin America still 
supported Israel. For a long time, Histadrut had been efficient courting the labor 
movement. But support had begun to erode as early as 1969, when Argentina’s 




Notwithstanding, in 1979 Kaufman et al were still optimistic, stating that with regard 
to influence on trade unions, students and intellectuals, ‘the balance tends to be 
positive for Israel.’
****** While some indicators may have pointed in that direction even 
then, the crude fact was that while Israel courted a military elite that was soon to be 
demonized and trashed, the Arabs courted popular organizations that antagonized 
increasingly with the local tyrants, and which were soon to be the electoral backbone 
of the political parties that would dominate the political scene after the wave of 
democratisation, with full US support. 
 
Moreover, militant Arab organisations made further inroads into Latin America 
because of the establishment of immigrants who fled southern Lebanon during the 
Israeli occupation. These people are enemies of Israel, and the so-called Tri Border 
region of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina has an important concentration of such 
immigrants. According to a recent study, the Arab colonies in Ciudad del Este and Foz 
do Iguaçu add up to some 18.000 inhabitants, of which 90% are Lebanese, with small 
percentages of Syrians, Egyptians, Palestinians and Jordans.
†††††† 
 
The consequences are serious. According to reputable reports based on open-source 
intelligence,  
 
There is ample evidence that various Islamic terrorist groups have used the Tri-
Border area (TBA) as a haven for fund-raising, recruiting, and plotting terrorist 
attacks elsewhere in the Tri Border countries or the Americas in general. 
Terrorist groups with a presence in the Tri Border area reportedly include 
Egypt’s Islamic Group and Islamic Jihad, al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and al-
Moqawama, which is a pro-Iran wing of Hezbollah. Islamic terrorist groups have 
used the TBA for fund-raising, drug trafficking, money laundering, plotting, and 
other activities in support of their organizations. The large Arab community in 
the TBA is highly conducive to the establishment of sleeper cells of Islamic 
terrorists, including Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. Nevertheless, as many as 11.000 
members of the Islamic community in the TBA may have moved since late 2001 
to other less closely watched Arab population centers in South America.
‡‡‡‡‡‡  
 
It must be borne in mind that even before the 1982 Lebanon War, this new wave of 
Arab immigrants that arrived in Latin America starting in the late ‘60s was very   10 
different from the ‘old’ Arab immigration of the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries. 
Unlike their predecessors, they are predominantly Muslims and tend to conserve the 
Arabic tongue for use at home, at work and in commercial transactions. They establish 
strong associations and networks based on religious loyalties, including Muslim 
schools, Islamic centers, and mosques. As has been observed by sociologist Beatriz 
Gurevich, they behave like an ethnic community whose diasporic identity overshadows 
their national identity as Argentines, Brazilians or Paraguayans.  
 
This is especially true of the Shiites in Argentina, who underwent a limited identity shift 
after seven former Iranian officials and a Hezbollah operative were accused, by 
Argentine authorities, of a direct involvement in the 1994 bombing of the Asociación 
Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA). Although mainly of Lebanese origin, these Shiites 
took sides with Iran, against the Argentine judiciary.  
 
In this and other issues, their attitudes are increasingly those of a diasporic community 
with several layers of identity components. When their ethnic and Argentine identities 
come into conflict, it seems that they tend to Tehran, more than to Buenos Aires, as a 
source of inspiration. And they have links with politically significant Argentine protest 
organizations, where they actively proselytize.
§§§§§§ 
 
The Jewish side of the quadrangle 
 
As is well-known, the history of the investigation of the AMIA bombing is one of 
continuous frustrations, largely stemming from the obstruction of justice undertaken 
by the Menem, De la Rúa and Duhalde administrations.
******* Paradoxically, the two 
Kirchner administrations are to be credited with comparatively courageous actions, 
such as exposing Iran during three consecutive inaugurations of the United Nations 
General Assembly: in 2007, under Nestor, and in 2008 and 2009, under Cristina.
††††††† 
These high profile criticisms of Iran, made personally by two presidents, were the 
sequel of the government’s request for arrest warrants against the aforementioned 
Iranians, which was issued to Interpol in 2007. Moreover, when Ahmad Vahidi, one of 
the officials indicted by the Argentine judiciary, was anointed Iran’s minister of defense 
and security in August 2009, both the Argentine foreign ministry and the chief of the 
national cabinet issued stern official condemnations of the Tehran regime’s 
appointment.  
 
Such attitudes are very rare in the populist context of today’s Latin American politics, 
of which the Kirchners are clearly a part. True, they are financial allies of Venezuela’s 
Hugo Chávez, who is Iran’s ally, but they draw the line eloquently when Caracas pushes 
for closer ties with Tehran. And they also draw the line when it comes to sensitive 
nuclear technology, which they do not transfer to Venezuela. 
 
Yet the central institutions of Argentina’s Jewish community seem reluctant to 
acknowledge these gestures because for many influential members of the community, 
class identity seems to takes precedence over Jewish identity.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The Kirchners are 
part of a populist order that Argentina’s bourgeoisie repudiates and wants brought   11 
down. And the most influential leaders of Argentina’s Jewish community are, above all, 
mainstream members of Argentina’s bourgeoisie. 
 
This was clearly demonstrated by an article published in The New York Times on 7 
August 2007. It bore the title “Jews in Argentina Wary of Nation’s Ties to Chavez”, and 
it documented concerns over energy-related bilateral deals. The main source cited was 
the Latin American representative of the Simon Wiesenthal Center. The interviewee 
and the reporter seemed to be impervious to fact that what makes Venezuela 
dangerously rich are, precisely, US oil imports. Indeed, Buenos Aires’ policy towards 
Chavez is not all that different from Washington’s, insofar as both are pragmatic when 
it comes to oil and money, and both draw the line with respect to Caracas’ links with 
Iran. Apparently, what is demanded in the name of the Argentine Jewry is that 
Argentina be more anti-Chavez than the United States. 
 
Such double standards and exaggerated anti-Chavez advocacy are typical of right-of-
center political sectors in Buenos Aires, Caracas, Miami and elsewhere in Latin 
America, regardless of religious or ethnic affiliation. The common denominator is class 
affiliation. It is true that a political opposition has the right to voice its objections, 
whether they be fair or unfair. But the civil society leaders who were quoted lobbied as 
Jews, and thus were they presented to the US public. The implication is that the 
Kirchner’s relations with Chavez are dangerous to Argentina’s Jews. This is a very 
perilous trend that could do a lot of damage to Jewish and Israeli interests, as it has in 
the past.  
 
The manipulation of anti-Semitism 
 
Indeed, few people remember today that in 1983 the White House framed the 
Sandinista government of Nicaragua with false charges of anti-Semitism, as a means to 
mobilize the US Jewry in favor of Washington’s so-called ‘Contra policy’ of arming the 
subversive opponents of the leftist government. This episode was an attempt to 
neutralize a leak that had exposed Israel’s activities in support of right-wing 
combatants in Central America.  
Research undertaken by scholars, journalists and the US government later traced the 
maneuver to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In a secret cable following a White 
House briefing of 1983 in which President Ronald Reagan and the director of the Anti-
Defamation League’s Latin American Division, Rabbi Morton Rosenthal, had accused 
the Sandinistas of anti-Semitism, Amb. Anthony Quainton, the US envoy to Managua, 
stated that ‘the evidence fails to demonstrate that the Sandinistas have followed a 
policy of anti-Semitism.’  
Among many other testimonies we can cite Sergio Nudelstejer, who headed the 
American Jewish Committee’s Mexico office. He said that the reasons why many 
members of Nicaragua’s tiny Jewish community had left the country were related to 
“factors other than anti-Semitism, including their belonging to the propertied classes.” 
Following the fall of Anastasio Somoza in 1979, many who had enjoyed his favors fled 
and suffered confiscations, whether Jews or Gentiles.
§§§§§§§  
   12 
Indeed, as reported by the World Jewish Congress, Panama City Rabbi Heszel Klepfisz 
(a recognized leader of Central American Jewry) informed that he had been to 
Nicaragua in September 1983 and found no traces of anti-Semitism, although there 
was an anti-Israel feeling. Wrote Klepfisz: “The statements of Rabbi Rosenthal are not 
based on fact and do damage to the Jewish cause in Central America and, in my 
opinion, also to Israel’.
********  
 
Furthermore, the Council of Hemispheric Studies (COHA) of Washington DC concluded 
that:  
 
While anti-Zionism sometimes spills over into anti-Semitism, there is little 
evidence that this has transpired in contemporary Nicaragua. (Its foreign policy 
is determined by) the sort of sympathy with the Palestinian cause that is de 
rigueur among left-leaning Third World regimes. This sentiment, coupled with 
the role Israel has played in arming rightist regimes throughout Latin America, 




These concepts are as valid for 2009 as they were for 1987. In those bygone days, 
Israel had been put on the wrong side of history vis-à-vis Latin America due to its 
asymmetrical alliance with the United States, and to the US’s alliance with the right-
wing tyrants of the region. This configuration did not help local Jews, nor did it 
mitigate the Latin American military’s anti-Jewish attitudes.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Furthermore, 
making things worse, the struggle against anti-Semitism was manipulated by the 
United States government.    
 
Presently, it is the Latin American Jewish leaderships which, because of their 
mainstream status in Latin American bourgeoisies, could put the local Jewish 
communities on the wrong side of history once again, reinforcing the prejudices 
generated by the unfortunate circumstances of the past.  
 
Once again, political opponents on the other side of the class-divide are being smeared 
with direct or indirect accusations of anti-Semitism. The New York Times article cited is 
but the tip of the iceberg. Let us delve on a couple of additional examples. 
 
One such case is a U-Tube video I recently received from a distinguished member of 
the Argentine Jewish community, with the enthusiastic caption ‘view it before it is 
banned!’ It is an excerpt from Oliver Hirschbiegel’s film “The Fall”. The script, spoken in 
German by Bruno Ganz, who impersonates Hitler, is translated in the Spanish subtitles 
as if it were Kirchner’s terrifying speech. He refers to his wife Cristina, the current 
president, in offensive terms, and his interlocutors call him Nestor. 
 
The people who circulate such material seem to be indifferent to the fact that a 
skeptical beholder who does not buy this propaganda might wonder if there is as little 
truth to Hitler’s association with a Jewish Holocaust as there is to the analogy between 
the Nazis and the Kirchners. Indeed, the piece is in itself an insult to Holocaust victims 
and breeds Holocaust denial. Yet it has been circulated, among others, by anti-Kirchner   13 
Jews who seem to be more interested in smearing the President and former President 
than in protecting the Jewish cause, partly because there is no clear and present 
danger. So they manipulate Hitler and the Holocaust to tender to non-Jewish class 
interests. 
 
Another telling example is the slander used against Venezuela’s Chavez, who may 
indeed be an anti-Semite, but who has been smeared with apocryphal speeches often 
circulated by leading members of Latin America’s Jewish communities. One such text, 
purported to be of his authorship, which I received on January 31, 2009 through an e-
mail from the leader of an important Argentine Masorti institution, read: 
 
We the Chavistas despise the Jews and do not recognize the State of Israel or 
any national or international Jewish organization. We deem it intolerable that 
an important part of the canonical narration about the deportation and death 
of Jews under the Nazi system should have been coined in mythological form by 
treacherous Jewish animals, and that Zionism be used today to preserve the 
existence of a colonial enterprise endowed with a monotheistic religious 
ideology (which is mystically-Satanic) and which has the objective of having 
Demonic Israel posses Holy Arab Palestine. 
 
The e-mail was headed by a caption saying: ‘Incredible. Please circulate urgently. 
Terrifying. Our President is a friend of this gorilla!’ I consulted with a member of 
Venezuela’s Jewish community on the plausibility of Chavez’s authorship, and she 
replied that although the Comandante was not an innocent child, he has not yet coined 
this type of discourse. She added that there are people in his government who could 
conceivably say such things, especially Tarek El Aissami, the Minister of the Interior 
and Justice, who has family ties to the organizers of Hezbollah cells in the state of 
Zulia, in northern Venezuela. And she sadly informed me that on that very night, 
fifteen armed thugs had profaned the Sephardite synagogue in Caracas. 
 
The situation indeed merits concern, not so much because of Chavez’s ideology but 
because of the radicalization that can conceivably be produced by the multiplication of 
frauds like the quoted text, which can easily become self-fulfilling prophesies. And as in 
the case of the White House’s 1983 false accusations against the Sandinistas, some 
people, both local and foreign, would be delighted if such texts could demonstrably be 
attributed to Chavez, because that would make an attack on the regime all the more 
legitimate. 
 
This attitude, which exists, is quite at odds with its opposite, that also exists, and which 
is exemplified by the statement issued by the World Jewish Congress when 
Venezuela's ambassador to Argentina visited the Museum of the Holocaust in Buenos 
Aires, in October 2008. Jack Terpins, president of the Latin American Jewish Congress, 
then stated: ‘The Jewish community in South America, especially the one in Buenos 
Aires, appreciates it as an encouraging sign that the Venezuelan Government sees fit 
to acknowledge the tragedy of the Holocaust.’ And World Jewish Congress secretary-
general Michael Schneider added:  
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Following our visit to Caracas in August, it is gratifying to see this sign of 
recognition by the Venezuelan Government of the dark tragedy that befell the 
Jewish people, something that President Hugo Chavez himself acknowledged 
during our meeting with him. 
 
Notwithstanding, there are people who want to undo the World Jewish Congress’s 
good work and slander Chavez for the sake of antisocialist, pro-capitalist politics. 
Indeed, if you declare a cold war on Chavez’s ‘21
st Century Socialism’, you will not be 
prone to the World Jewish Congress’s civilized encouragement for Chavez to do the 
right thing regarding Jewish causes, and might even prefer that he become an outright 
Holocaust denier.  
 
Furthermore, it is not to be discarded that this sort of campaign is encouraged by 
American “public diplomacy”, through which the State Department discreetly appeals 
to various special interest groups to support its own interests. If they did it in 1983, 
they can do it in 2009. After all, their priority in Venezuela is the downfall of Chavez 
through formally democratic means. They will not refrain from buying his oil, but they 
will encourage the Argentine opposition to criticize the Kirchners for doing the same, 
and even present it as dangerous to the Jewish cause, as did the Wiesenthal Center in 
The New York Times. 
 
The bottom line is that in Latin America, Washington continues to side covertly with 
the right-wing and against the left-of-center governments that the impoverished 
masses are likely to elect, given the full-fledged electoral democracy that, starting in 
1983, was virtually imposed upon the region, paradoxically by Washington itself.  
 
This state-of-affairs, which is very costly to Latin America but carries few costs to the 
United States, is complemented by the fact that, because of non-Jewish class interests, 
the leaders of Latin America’s Jewish communities will tend to side with the right-wing 
and against the left-of-center governments. Thus, the sad predicament that befell 
upon Jewish causes as a consequence of Israel’s status as an US proxy in the 70s and 
80s, tends to perpetuate itself in the new set of circumstances. 
  
This problem was foreseeable and can be inferred from the anticipatory words of 
caution published as early as 1972 by Haim Avni, before Israel became a proxy and 
previous also to the final spate of military dictatorships: 
 
The economic and social stratification of Latin American Jews is not, of course, 
conducive to lessening left-wing hostility.
§§§§§§§§ 
 
Avni’s insight was unfortunately fulfilled. And given the Latin American levels of 
poverty, the populist tide is there to stay. To oppose it is the legitimate right of all 
citizens, no matter how fruitless the effort might be. But to oppose it in the name of 
Jewish organizations is to call for greater evils.   
 
‘The strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must’ 
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In the present day, as a consequence of the processes reviewed, Israel is a liability to 
even the best disposed of Latin American governments. This became patently clear in 
2007, when the leaders of the MERCOSUR countries, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay, signed an unprecedented free trade agreement with Israel. The accord 
showed official good will, inasmuch as the MERCOSUR bloc usually relates to other 
blocs but not to individual states. But what was really significant was the strong leftist 
opposition triggered by the treaty, quite the opposite of what would have happened 
before Israel became a proxy of the United States, when the leftists were friendly to 




Indeed, the case of the MERCOSUR agreement illustrates the present-day 
consequences of Israel’s past role as a proxy of the United States. As things stand, 
every official transaction with Israel has plenty of enemies to attack it and hardly any 
friends to support it in a visible way. This is why, of the members of the MERCOSUR 
bloc, so far only Uruguay has been able to ratify the agreement. 
 
In contrast, no matter how stigmatized, a hegemonic state with overwhelming might 
recovers more easily from the loss of local influence and prestige stemming from 
alliances with local villains, especially if it becomes the champion of democracy. Israel 
suffers the typical, Thucydidean predicament of a peripheral state left in the lurk by a 
hegemonic power and without even a moral right to complain about its senior 
partner’s betrayal. 
 
This brings us to a more general reflection on the consequences, both for peripheral 
allies and peripheral adversaries of the United States, of superpower policy failure, 
which is in itself a largely neglected but intriguing field of study. Take a couple of 
analogous cases:  
 
1)  Hilary Clinton admitted recently that American policy towards Cuba had failed 
and would change. The cost, for the United States, was slight, but in Cuban 
terms it meant the sacrifice of entire generations of citizens. 
2)  Under the illusion that democratizing Iraq was the right thing to do, the United 
States destroyed Saddam Hussein’s state machinery. But the only real 
achievement has been to advance the interests of Iraq's first minority, the 
Shiites, and in so doing advance the interests of Iran. Now the United States 
must withdraw to make troops available in Afghanistan, and the more dramatic 
costs of its blunders in Iraq will be paid by Middle Eastern allies such as Israel 
and Saudi Arabia, whose security has been needlessly put at risk. The cost for 
the United States is much lower. 
 
Likewise, US support of Latin American military dictatorships put Israel on the “wrong 
side” of history in that region of the world, and the American 1983 policy change had 
much more serious local consequences for Israel than for the United States. 
 
Conclusions 
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This paper explored long-term Israeli-Latin American relations with a special focus on 
the United States as a conditioning factor. It identified three phases: 1948-67, 1967-83 
and 1983-present. 
 
During the first phase, relations between Israel, the Latin American states and the Latin 
American leftist and populist sectors were excellent. This phase, characterized by the 
absence of a US-Israeli alliance, lasted from the creation of the State of Israel until 
shortly after the Six-Day War. Once an alliance between Israel and the United States 
was established and consolidated, however, relations with the Latin American left 
rapidly deteriorated. Notwithstanding, allowing for some notable exceptions,
††††††††† 
while the region was mostly under the influence of its military establishments the 
relations between Israel and the Latin American states remained excellent. 
Furthermore, they were profitable relations at a time when Israel was still 
economically weak. 
 
These relations took a turn for the worse, however, when the United States ceased to 
support Latin American military dictatorships and placed a virtual veto on them. 
Because during the 1970s and early 1980s Israel had largely become a proxy of the 
United States in the region, it lost the support of the leftist and populist sectors of the 
Latin American political spectrum. And when the United States abandoned its former 
military allies in Latin America, it put Israel on the “wrong side” of history, because 
Latin American politics came to be dominated largely by the left-of-center and populist 
sectors whose good will it had previously lost. 
 
This is a case in which the asymmetry typical of center-periphery relations worked in 
such a way as to destroy Israel’s soft power in the region. To preserve its interests, the 
stronger party (the United States) did what its might allowed it to do, reversing its 
previous endorsement of Latin American military dictatorships. In turn, the weaker 
party (Israel) suffered its inevitable Thucydidean predicament. The case illustrates one 
of several mechanisms through which the costs and benefits of asymmetrical alliances 
in non-Waltzian hierarchical interstate structures are distributed. It is thus relevant for 
the further development of peripheral realist theory.  
 
On the other hand, Israel’s Thucydidean predicament was especially damaging because 
of the Jewish state’s unique vulnerability. Peripheral realism applies to its case as it 
would not apply to other Western suppliers of arms and security services to Latin 
American rightist regimes, because Israel was (and remains) a beleaguered state 
whose enemies in the Middle East have constantly campaigned against it among 
populist and leftist organizations all over the world. These enemies made sure that it 
be stigmatized as other arms suppliers like Germany, Norway or Spain would never be, 
enhancing the negative consequences of Israel’s structural subordination. 
 
Further complicating the issue is the fact that most members of the Jewish 
communities of Latin America, and indeed their entire leaderships, belong to the 
privileged segments of their societal class-divides. Their interests in domestic politics 
usually coincide with those of other segments of the local bourgeoisies. Since they are 
usually identified with the State of Israel, their unpopular politics contribute to the   17 
alienation suffered by the latter ever since full electoral democracy was established in 
Latin America.  
 
Moreover, these leaderships’ complementary sub-identities as bourgeois and Jews are 
often confused. Their Jewish condition is sometimes invoked to defend unpopular non-
Jewish class interests, and this in turn feeds back into the negative public images of 
both Israel and the Jews.   
 
Indeed, even the United States government has been known to manipulate these 
delicate sensitivities. In turn, this observation opens a new field of inquiry related to 
the impact of center-periphery relations on diasporic behavior and its local 
consequences. The complexity of these quadrangular relations offers interesting 
opportunities for theory-building that might be relevant beyond this case study. 
 
Needless to say, all of these factors, but most especially the anti-Israeli preaching of 
Israel´s enemies, activated the ancestral Judeophobia cultivated by the Catholic Church 
during many centuries, making the problem even more acute. But the fact remains 
that, due to Israel’s peculiar position in the interstate system, the primary cause of 
today’s anti-Israeli feelings in the Latin American region is not anti-Semitism. 
Otherwise it would be difficult to explain the region’s overwhelmingly pro-Israeli 
attitudes during the first two decades of the Jewish state’s existence, not only on the 
side of governments but also of left-wing parties and organizations. It is hence a grave 
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